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1 n the fifth volume of the Holmes Devise His-
tory of the Supreme Court,! the late Pro-
fessor Carl Swisher, Taney's biographer,2 has 
written a history of the Court during Taney's 
tenure as Chief Justice. Roger Taney stands 
out in undistinguished surroundings. Justice 
Story, who served nine of his thirty-four years 
on the Court with Taney, seemed a relic of the 
past. "I am the last of the old race of judges," 
Story wrote.s Justices Miller and Field, al-
though appointed to the Court during Taney's 
last years, wrote their major opinions after 
his death. The most outstanding intellect on 
the Taney court may have been Benjamin 
Curtis, but he resigned and returned to private 
practice after only six years. Most of Taney's 
fellow justices remain in obscurity such as 
Justice McKinley of whom Swisher writes, "He 
made no significant contribution to legal think-
ing in any form."4 
Roger Taney rose to prominence as Andrew 
Jackson's chief aide in opposition to the Bank 
of the United States. This leadership provided 
some basis for concern that Taney would exalt 
state power at the expense of the federal gov-
ernment. Indeed, he did take the position that 
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states had the power within their borders to 
regulate interstate commerce unless contrary 
to an express federal law. Thus the Chief Jus-
tice was relegated to a concurrence instead of 
writing for the Court when Curtis developed 
his theory that state power over interstate com-
merce in the absence of congressional action 
depended on the nature of the commerce. 5 
Roger Taney contributed much to legal 
thought. While he assigned his associates many 
more opinions on substantive matters than did 
Marshall, 6 Chief Justice Taney still wrote most 
major opinions for the Court during this pe-
riod. Where significant opinions were given to 
others, the Chief Justice was often in dissent.7 
The first major c.ase of the Taney court was 
Charles River Bridges where Taney said that 
state grants of exclusive privileges should be 
narrowly construed. Thus a charter to build a 
bridge and collect the tolls was not violated by 
a subsequent charter to another company to 
build a competing bridge adjacent to the first. 
Any fears that this decision presaged a gen-
er.al abandonment of respect for contract obli-
gations were dispelled in Bronson v. Kinzie9 
where Taney, writing for the Court, invali-
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The most successful decisions 
of the T ane.y court ... 
presented some interreaction 
betwe.en the Court and the 
other branches of 
government. 
dated an Illinois law as an impairment of con-
tract. 
Despite Taney's concerns over the reach of 
federal power, he continued Marshall's tradi-
tion of federal supremacy. In Holmes v. Jen-
nison, 10 decided by an evenly divided Court, 
Taney said that the governor of .a state could 
not agree with the head of a foreign state to 
surrender fugitives because states were for-
bidden to enter into any agreement with a 
foreign power. In Ableman v. Booth,11 Taney 
wrote that state courts could not order the re-
lease of persons held under federal authority. 
Taney's creative imagination provided the 
foundation for modern admiralty law. In the 
Genosee Chie/,12 he surpassed even Story in 
extending federal jurisdiction in admiralty. 
80 
Under the traditional view, admiralty juris-
diction extended within a country only to 
waters affected by the tides. Taney argued for 
the Court that the concept of tidewater was 
appropriate in England because that small 
island nation's navigable waterways were all 
affected by the tide. That was not true in the 
United States where large bodies of water like 
the Great Lakes were major waters for ship-
ping, but were not tidewaters. Thus, Taney 
introduced the concept of navigability as the 
basis for admiralty jurisdiction. 
Patent law also owes much to Taney. Taney 
sustained most of Samuel Morse's claims for 
the invention of the telegraph in 0' Reilly v. 
Morse, 13 but he also announced that no patent 
could be given on a principle of nature as dis-
tinguished from a specific instrument exploit-
ing a principle. Morse and Gayler v. Wilder14 
(another Taney opinion) were milestones for 
American p·atent law. 
The most successful decisions of the Taney 
court, however, presented some interreaction 
between the Court and the other branches of 
government. Taney won acclaim for his de-
cision in Luther v. Borden,15 holding that the 
decision which government was the rightful 
government of a state was a political question 
committed to the executive and not the ju-
diciary for decision. In the Charles River 
Bridge Case16 and Bank of Augusta v. EarZe,11 
the legislatures were forced to be precise .and 
explicit where valuable rights were at stake, 
but they were permitted to act. 
One virtue of Swisher's book is the way he 
demonstrates the interrelationship between 
disputes over state and federal power and the 
issue of slavery. Like the slave quarters be-
hind Taney's house in Frederick, Maryland, 
slavery cast its shadow over the entire struc-
ture of law during this period. The constitu-
tional scope of states' rights and federal power 
were questioned by Southern attempts to re-
capture escaped slaves, to bar free negroes 
from the state, and to reassert the slave status 
of former slaves who had lived in free terri-
tory but returned voluntarily to a slave state. 
Cases like Prigg v. Pennsylvania,t8 The Schoon-
er Armistad/9 Groves v. Slaughter20 and 
Strader v. Graham21 are products of the slav-
ery controversy, yet they helped shape the 
structure of federalism in areas far removed 
from that issue. But Dred Scott v. Sandford22 
had the greatest impact. 
VoL.V 
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The Dred Scott decision is not important for 
its influence on the outbreak of the war, but 
for leaving the Court powerless during the war. 
The decision that Scott was not entitled to his 
freedom could easily have been predicted on 
the basis of Strader v. Graham. In fact, Jus-
tice Nelson was originally assigned the opinion 
for the Court on the assumption that the de-
cision of the Missouri Court finding that Scott 
was still a slave under Missouri law was de-
terminative of his status. However, the dis-
senters discussed the right of negroes to sue in 
federal courts and the validity of the Missouri 
Compromise barring slavery from the terri-
tories. Since the issues had been raised, Jus-
tice Taney decided to confront them directly. 
Taney may have hoped that by preventing 
negroes from using the federal courts to win 
freedom and by preventing the federal govern-
ment from legislating prohibitions on slavery, 
the Court would relieve the Southern fears of 
abolitionism which were driving toward seces-
sion. In Dred Scott, the Court foreclosed com-
promise. Political compromise was impossible 
anyway. The Missouri Compromise treated in 
the decision had already been repealed by the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act. But Dred Scott made 
the Court, instead of political realities, appear 
the obstacle to compromise, so the Court itself 
became the target for abolitionist wrath. 23 This 
in turn left it powerless to deal effectively with 
problems arising out of the war. That debili-
ating effect on the institution of the Court 
gives Dr>ed Scott its unique importance in his-
tory. 
With the onset of the Civil War, the Court 
moved into the background of events. Legal 
questions on the war's conduct occasionally 
reached the Court, but only the Prize24 cases 
which upheld presidential power to impose a 
blockade are notable. Taney did his best to pro-
tect dissent during the war. His opinion as cir-
cuit justice in Ex Parte M erryman25 risked 
Lincoln's wrath to preserve habeas corpus un-
less suspended by congressional action. But 
Swisher chronicles the impossibility of en-
forcing the writ and the mechanisms used to 
avoid court tests, so that dissenters had to rely 
on pres:idential grace. Taney's opinions on 
civil liberties during the war were consistent 
with his lifelong opposition to abuses of power, 
but they were also consistent with his belief in 
secession and his friendship with persons who 
were jailed. 
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This review has indicated the importance of 
the Court's decisions during this period and the 
influence of its Chief Justice, but it does not 
capture the skill and vivacity with which Pro-
fessor Swisher chronicles it. In telling the 
Court's story during the Taney period, 
Swisher has written the best of the three vol-
umes so far in the Holmes Devise History of 
the Supreme Court.26 He has used the corre-
spondence, articles and speeches of the period 
to let the participants tell about the events. 
The total picture of the Court is here--quarrels 
with the Reporter, 27 maneuvering for appoint-
T aney•s opinions on civil 
libert·ie.s during the war were 
consistent with his lifelong 
opposition to abuses of power. 
but they were also consistent 
with his belief in secession 
and his friendship with persons 
who were iailed. 
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ment,28 even the living conditions of the Jus-
tices down to Justice Davis' assurances to his 
wife that he tasted only one of the several dif-
ferent wines served at a dinner party.29 There 
is an extraordinary portrait of Taney near his 
death, writing to get more of his Sp-anish 
cigars, complaining about the breakage of 
bottles of wine sent him, facing financial dif-
ficulties and too feeble to make visits-writing 
th.at he and his daughter were "fit for no place 
but home and feel that we ought not to sadden 
the homes of our friends by bringing to them 
our daily aches and pains."so 
The same bright and shiny objects which 
make The Taney Period such fascinating 
reading produce two objections. The first is 
the unnecessary repetition of attractive quotes. 
We know Story better for Lord Morpeth's 
statement that "when he was in the room few 
others could get in a word."31 Justice Daniel's 
indignant letter protesting his Circuit Court 
duties is equally instructive: "I am here two 
thousand miles from home (calculating by the 
travelling route,) on a pilgrimage by an ex-
posure to which, it was the calculation of fed-
eralist malignity that I would be driven from 
the Bench."82 But in each case, once is enough,33 
The second criticism is both larger and more 
debatable. Swisher devotes space to colorful 
cases that could be used to trace individual 
judges' intellectual development. For example, 
he devotes sixteen pages of one chapter84 to 
Myra Gaines' suit to inherit land in the heart 
of New Orleans. The financial stakes were high 
and the stories of romantic liaisons and secret 
marriages are colorful indeed. But the Louisi-
ana laws on illegitimacy were not yet ripe to 
make legal history, 35 so the case is preserved 
for its color and not its legal importance. To 
some extent the same is true of the almost 
forty pages36 devoted to California land claims 
after the discovery of gold. Great names, great 
sums and great chicanery abounded, but great 
law did not. The substance of both chapters is 
essential to a true picture of the business of 
the Court, but they could have been condensed 
from the detailed treatment given. 
Although both chapters are enjoyable read-
ing, they have squeezed out discussion of Jus-
tice Curtis' development from slave-owner's 
counsel to his Dred Scott dissent. Curtis was on 
the Court partly because of his prominence in 
Commonwealth v. Aves87 representing the 
owner whose slave accompanied him to Boston 
and who claimed the right to take her back to 
Southern territory as a slave. Curtis' defense 
of congressional power to enact the Missouri 
Compromise is not surprising, but his opinion 
Great names. great sums and great chicanery a bounded, but 
great law did not. 
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Taney himself had emancipated all his slaves except for 
two, who were too old to provide for themse.lves, more than 
thirty years before the Dred Scott 
decision. He even made a speech in 1819 
characterizing slavery as a blot on the. national character. 
that Dred Scott must be free on his voluntary 
return to slave territory needed explanation. 
Was Curtis converted by his teacher Story into 
an abolitionist along with his nationalizing 
view of common law? Was he influenced by his 
brother, George Curtis, who was one of the 
counsel for Dred Scott? Were his actions in 
Aves as an attorney contrary to his personal 
views? Did he change his mind or could he 
make his advocacy in Aves and his dissent in 
Dred Scott consistent? The questions arise 
naturally, but Swisher avoids conjecture. 
These blemishes, whether real or in the eye 
of this beholder, are insignificant in com-
parison to the merits of the book. After many 
years of controversy, Roger Taney has many 
memorials. His bust is in the Supreme Court, as 
his old home in Frederick is a national shrine, 89 
and even Professor Swisher's earlier book 
honors him. But this book places him accu-
rately in the midst of his times and is his :finest 
memorial. A memorial honors both the person 
and the artisan who builds it. This outstanding 
volume in the Holmes Devise History of the 
Supreme Court honors Chief Justice Taney, 
his associates, and its author, Carl Swisher. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 C. SWISHER, 5 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DE-
VISE HISTORY OF THE 'SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64 (1974) [:herein-
·after SWISHER]. 
2 C. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935). 
a SWISHER at 93. 
4 !d. at 67. McKinley, of course, was the least dis-
tinguished of all the judges, with little to show for his 
fifteen years on the bench except illness and complaints 
from his Circuit. Other justices were both more color-
ful and more ·acute, but their contributions to the de-
velopment of constitutional law by their opinions are 
minor in comp•arison to Taney or more noted later 
judges. 
'·Cooley v. Bo•ard of Wardens of the Port of Phlila-
delphi:a, 12 How. 299 (1852). This case is discussed in 
SWISHER ·at 404-7. 
6 SWISHER at 98, 968. 
7 See Smith Thompson's opinion in Kendall v. United 
States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), ordering the Postmaster 
General to pay certain sum·s, with T•aney dissenting 
on procedural grounds. See also the opinions of Justice 
·Curtis in Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens and Justice Grier 
in the Prize eases. 
8 Charles River Bridge v. Warren River Bridge, 11 
Pet. 420 (1837). This case is discussed in SWISHER at 
74-98. 
"1 How. 311 (1843) is discussed in SWISHER at 147-
52. The position of the Court in Bronson was accepted 
for nearly a century, but in Home Building and lizyan 
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), the Court expanded 
its view of the legitimate use of government power .to 
protect debtors during times of emergency. 
10 14 Pet. 540 (1840) is discussed in SWISHER at 
174-77. 
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11 Ableman v. Bo'Oth, 21 How. 506 (1859), i's discussed 
in SWISHER at 653-72. 
12 Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443 
(1852), is discussed in SWISHER at 442-47. Story was 
fabled for his extensions of the admiralty power, so it 
was said "if a bucket of water were brought into his 
court with ·a corn cob floating in it, he would at once 
extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States 
over it." SWISHER at 425. Yet even Story clung to the 
concept that admiralty extended only to waters within 
the ebb and flow of the tide. The Thomas Jefferson, 10 
Wheat. 428, 429 (1825). Story would have found juris-
diction to regulate traffic on inland waterways in the 
Commerce ·Clause, but it was Taney's aversion to ex-
tensions of federal power through the Commerce Clause 
that led him to base jurisdiction in 'admiralty. 
13 15 How. 62 (1854) is discussed in SWISHER at 
488-504. 
14 10 How. 477 (1851) is discussed in SWISHER at 
510-11. Gayler established the principle that a dis-
covery which was never made public and finally was 
forgotten or abandoned would not prevent a patent 
for a person who later invented the same machine. 
Justice Nels·on had so charged the jury below, but 
Taney wrote the Supreme Court's opinion. 
"'7 How. 1 (1849) is discussed in SWISHER at 515-
27. 
'" 11 Pet. 420. 
17 13 Pet. 519 (1839), where the Court held that 
foreign corporations were 'assumed to have the right 
to make contracts through their agents in other states 
unles·s such other state specifically prohibited it. The 
case is discussed in SWISHER at 115-21. 
18 16 Pet. 539 (1842), where it was held that the 
federal Fugitive Slave Law preempts state jurisdiction 
over kidnapping an escaped slave. The case is dis-
cussed in SWISHER •at 537-47. 
19 15 Pet. 518 (1841), holding ·the Court will look 
into the underlying facts in a ·dispute over a treaty 
provision. It declared that persons who had been ill~ 
gaily enslaved and rebelled to take 'Over the slave ship 
were not subject to the treaty with Spain which pro-
vided for restoration of ships •and property seized by 
pirates or robbers despite the representations of both 
Spain and the executive branch of the United States 
government that the treaty ·applied and underlying 
facts should not be examined by the Court. The case 
is discussed in SWISHER at 189-96. 
""15 Pet. 449 (1841), where the Court held that a 
provision in the Mississippi Constitution forbidding 
imp'ortation into state for sale was not effective until 
an implementing statute was passed. Thus ,a debt con-
tracted for the purchase of slaves before the statute 
was valid •and could be enforced. However, the issue 
of the power of a state to forbid such commerce was 
argued in the case and produced great diversity of 
opinion. The case Is discussed in SWISHER at 365-70. 
21 10 How. 82, 97 (1851), where the Court held that 
while in Kentucky the status of negroes was deter-
mined by Kentucky law and not by that of the free 
state where they had resided for some time ·or by the 
laws of the United States. Thus persons who aided 
their escape were liable to their owner in damages. 
This case is discussed in SWISHER at 556-58. 
••19 How. 393 (1857) is discus·sed in SWISHER at 
592-652. 
23 Chief Justice T·aney did not enhance the Court's 
reputation by his statement that 'at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution negroes were considered 
as "a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who 
had been subjugated by the dominant race, and whether 
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their au-
thority and had no rights or privileges but such as 
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those who held the power and the government might 
choose to grant them." Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 
393, 404-5 (1857). But the ready attribution of Taney's 
understanding of the historical record to Taney's per-
sonal views was probably affected by outrage a.t the 
other aspects of the case. Taney himself had emanci-
pated all his slaves except for two, who were too old 
to provide for themselves, more than thirty years 
before the decision. See SWISHER at 644. He even made 
·a speech in 1819 characterizing slavery as ·a blot on the 
national character. See SWISHER ·at 740. 
24 2 Black 635 (1863) is discussed in SWISHER at 
877-900. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the 
Court with Taney dissenting on the grounds that the 
blockade was no·t legal until authorized by Congress. 
However, all the judges concurred that the blockade 
was proper after the date when Congress ratified it. 
This decision received much attention in recent years, 
and Jus·tice Taney''s position on the illegality of war 
measures without a declaration of war by Congress 
was warmly supported by many opponents. of Ameri-
can involvement in Vietn·a:m. 
.. 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) is discussed in 
SWISHER at 840-54. John Merryman was arrested in 
his home in Cockeysville. He wa·s a prominent f'armer 
and a member of the Maryl·and legislature. His father 
h·ad attended Dickinson in the same period as Chief 
Justice Taney. 
26 J. GOEBEL, HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE Su-
PREME COURT, VOL. I, ANTECENDENTS AND BEGINNINGS 
TO 1801 ( 1971), reviewed by this reviewer 4 MD. L. 
FORUM 77 (1974); FAIRMAN, HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT, VoL. VI, RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REUNION, 1864-88 PART ONE (1971), reviewed by this 
reviewer 3 MD. L. FORUM 20 (1972); ·and SWISHER, 
reviewed herein. 
01 SWISHER at 296-319. 
28 Id. at 205-47 and at 311-40. 
29 Id. at 836. 
30 Id. 'at 964-65. 
81 I d. at 43. 
32 I d. •at 69. 
33 Morpeth's quote on Story is repeated at 263 of 
SWISHER; Daniels' letter reappears in full at 258. 
34 SwrsHER at 756-72. The Gaines litigation reached 
the Supreme Court fifteen times on different issues. 
Ex parte Whitney, 13 Pet. 404 (1839); Gaines v. Relf, 
15 Pet. 9 (1841); Gaines v. Chew, 2 H'Ow. 619 (1844); 
Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 550 (1848); Gaines v. 
Relf, 12 How. 472 (1852); and Gaines v. Hennen, 24 
How. 553 (1861) were decided during Taney's term in 
office, but the litigation continued until 1891. 
"' Myra's claim depended upon a finding of legiti-
macy for under Louisiana law ·a father's property 
could not be passed by will to illegitimate descendants. 
After the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, 
Louisiana's law disadvantaging illegitimates came 
within constitutional scrutiny and bas recently been 
the subject of ·a number of cases interpreting the 
Equal Protection Clause. Levy v. Louisi1ana, 391 U.S. 
68 (1968) ; Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); 
and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Go., 406 U.S. 
164 (1972). 
"' SWISHER at 773-810. 
"35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836) is discussed in 
SWISHER 'at 554. 
38 SWISHER at 372. Senator Charles Sumner was for 
many years able to prevent the appropriation of money 
for such a bus:t, but it was appropri-ated without con-
troversy in connection with appropriation for the bust 
of T'aney's successor Salmon P. Chase. 
'" SWISHER at 973. The house, at 121 South Bentz 
Street, is maintained as a shrine not only to Taney 
but ·also to his •brother-in-law Francis Scott Key. 
VOL.V 
